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The Economic Problem of Masochism in Education  
 
Ansgar Allen and Emile Bojesen1 
It is no secret that there is much to learn from masochism.2 But its lessons have yet to include the 
thought that educational relations might themselves be structured by a masochistic economy. 
Given that our claim for the existence of this economy is made from within the academy, care must 
be taken, unless the educational researchers who comment on it be considered exempt. Educational 
researchers are not above nor insulated from what they critique. Educational researchers actively 
participate in masochistic games of love and hate, pleasure and discomfort that define educational 
relationships. They participate directly as lovers and sufferers of education themselves, or indirectly 
by providing long, wearing critiques of education that function as so many reasons for 
disappointment. Everyday educators and educational researchers alike are tied, bound together, 
with the latter serving to reinforce this economy of pain by furnishing educators with a scholarly 
framework, an optional supplement, a pile of books, papers and reports within which they can 
somewhat pleasurably locate their suffering. But this is not all they achieve. In addition to providing 
lengthy disquisitions explaining what all educators already feel, and have long felt more acutely – 
namely, transposing into writing a sense of the ‘shitness’ of things – educational research helps 
sustain what it bemoans. It gives succour to that love of education, the educator’s love of what 
they do, that finds pleasure still in the discomfort and displeasure that education must necessarily 
produce. Educational research dignifies education with moral purpose and helps sustain our love 
for it by endlessly implying education must be worthy of morally informed critique and attention. 
We urge the reader to keep these discomforting ideas in mind, throughout the essay that follows. 
 
Approaching Freud 
 
In this essay, we treat Freud’s thought on masochism – and his accompanying discussion of the 
death drive – as symptomatic of his historical moment. We position Freud within, and view his 
work as being expressive of, an important moment in the history of subjectivity. For that reason, 
we deliberately sidestep the basic ontological claims one might associate with psychoanalytic 
readings of the human condition. Here we have the work of Michel Foucault in mind, in particular 
his claim that [with Freud] sexuality was only ‘constituted as an area of investigation’ because 
‘relations of power had established it as a possible object’.3 Freud could only discuss sexuality, as 
he did, because relations of power had already constituted it as a historically contingent, noteworthy 
phenomenon. As Leo Bersani put it: ‘Foucault reminds us how little Freud innovated’.4 Freud gave 
scientific form (and new institutional impetus) to a longstanding disciplinary injunction to know 
yourself and to declare what you are. Nonetheless, and despite our attempt to locate Freud in 
history, his work was not purely reactive or symptomatic of his time. According to Bersani, it had 
the potential to revolutionise the historical phenomena of which it was an expression. There is a 
                                                                    
1 The order of authors’ names is alphabetical and does not indicate priority. 
2 Some of the most important studies since Freud include, Deleuze 1999; Bersani 1986 and Laplanche 1976.  
3 Foucault, 1998, p. 98. 
4 Bersani, 1986, p. 30. 
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destructive radicalism – or what Bersani calls a ‘self-destroying intelligence’5 – operating in Freud’s 
work. In other words, his work may still undermine what it anatomises, although in doing so it 
must also undermine and evacuate its own authority as an objective science. In Bersani’s reading, 
Freud is not simply an agent of disciplinary power, though this is often his function. Freudianism 
may well have become ‘the most pervasive, and the most prestigious modern form of a discursive 
technology of self-knowledge and self-creation’, but Freud’s work also bore the potential to destroy 
‘the technology he brilliantly exemplifies by his very attempt to make its assumptions explicit’.6 It 
is with this argument in mind that we make the following claim: 
 
When Freud discusses masochism, he extends the psychoanalytic gaze to a set of relations – 
relations by which we are formed through practices of self-discipline and self-mortification – that 
have been developing and extending their hold on Western subjectivity since the Christian pastoral. 
In so doing, he also allows us to ponder how those relations might be undermined, or recast. In 
this paper we are primarily interested in these relations insofar as they are also educational relations.7 
We have discussed the Christian pastoral and its connection to education at length elsewhere.8 Very 
briefly, and for the purposes of this paper, by ‘Christian pastoral’ we refer to the modes of 
introspection and self-mortification developed by the church and its medieval pastorate. As Ian 
Hunter argued, although these modes of introspection and subject formation were developed by 
the Church, they were not confined to its institutions, and eventually managed to ‘slip their 
doctrinal moorings’, providing amongst other things the ‘core moral technology of the school’.9 
These pastoral relations and techniques still operate in such a way that ‘binds the educator to his 
pupils by committing the educator to a project of mutual redemption’.10 Pastoral power ensures 
that the educator still inherits something of the connection, and self-understanding, that once tied 
a pastor to his congregation, where the plight of the educator is ‘fettered to the plight of those to 
be educated’, ensuring that teachers ‘carry the success of education, and the educational encounter 
on their conscience’.11 
 
Though we have not yet put it in these terms, there is something decidedly masochistic operating 
here at the core of our commitment to education, where educators, and students, endure 
considerable discomfort for the ‘love’ of education. This love is driven by an enduring perception 
of the inherent significance, intrinsic nobility and foundational importance of what they do. Here 
we must be specific. We are using masochism in the strong, exacting sense, developed by Freud. 
To adapt Laplanche’s reading of (Freud’s reading of) masochism to our current purposes: we argue 
that ‘the [educational] subject is masochistic’ properly speaking, ‘only insofar as he [or she] derives 
enjoyment precisely where he [or she] suffers, and not insofar as he [or she] suffers in one place in 
order to derive enjoyment in another’. Or, to put it slightly differently, ‘the subject suffers in order 
to derive enjoyment and not only in order to be able to derive enjoyment (or to pay the “tax” for 
enjoyment)’.12 This distinction is crucial, as many would agree that education involves the 
acquisition of some ability or other to defer gratification. From this more easily accepted, socially 
acceptable, point of view, educational discomfort may be necessary in order to deliver us to the 
                                                                    
5 Bersani, 1986, p. 12. 
6 Bersani, 1986, p. 30. 
7 A note on our use of the term ‘education’ is perhaps necessary: It is common in educational critique to argue that ‘education’ 
refers to something greater than ‘schooling’. This argument is made against those who are said to confuse the latter reality with the 
former idea and who find themselves unable, as a result, to imagine that education might be different, that it might be better than 
what it is in its institutional manifestation. Departing from this point of view, and its accompanying insistence that we define what 
we mean by education (against all that would debase it), we do not seek to dignify or overly clarify the term. Rather, we allow 
deliberate conceptual slippage between the meaning of education in the more specific, institutional sense (involving salaried teachers, 
institutionalised children, classrooms, assemblies, auditors, administrators, inspectors, and so on), and education in the broadest 
sense of the word, understood as the set of inherited techniques and cultural practices that structure and produce the social relations 
and subjectivities that define Western modernity. We argue that this approach better reflects the complexity and systematic 
evasiveness if not functional duplicity of an idea that has risen to such prominence in the modern era.  
8 Allen, 2017; 2014; Bojesen, 2018; 2017.  
9 Hunter, 1994, p. xxi. 
10 Allen, 2017, p. 64. 
11 Allen, 2017, p. 61. 
12 Laplanche, 1976, p. 104. 
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fulfillment that education promises. To exemplify this position (which is not our own), the educator 
might say: ‘You may not, for instance, enjoy the homework we set, but if you stick with it, it will 
bear fruit in terms of a better understanding of your subject matter.’ You must, in effect, pay an 
educational tax, for the fulfillment that education promises to deliver you to. But this is the extent 
of the role of suffering in education, according to this point of view. Our understanding of 
masochism is clearly different. We aim to develop and substantiate the far more radical claim that 
masochism in education involves a more intimate, immediate link between suffering and 
enjoyment. We propose, then, to extend our previous work by investigating the possible link 
between our collective, inbuilt commitment to education, and what Freud offers by way of a theory 
of masochism. In line with the position set out above, and to avoid misunderstanding, it is worth 
pointing out that our argument is limited to a form of diagnosis that attempts to identify the 
historically contingent, masochistic workings of education, without thereby claiming that all 
education is, or that education must always be, essentially masochistic.  
 
The Economic Problem of Masochism 
In ‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’, a brief essay by Freud originally published in 1924, we 
encounter its three principle forms (according to Freud): feminine, erotogenic and moral (or 
mental13) masochism.14 Once we get beyond the initial shock invited by the suggestion that the 
experience of Western education is basically masochistic, or at least has strong masochistic 
tendencies (and we should not underestimate the difficulty of reaching this position, our point of 
departure); it is perhaps easiest to link moral masochism with the kinds of mental torture education 
is often associated with. We can see the imprint of something like moral masochism in the kinds 
of self-regulating, disciplinary, confessional practices education has us enact. When faced with the 
three forms of masochism, we will most likely find ourselves able to make this associative link for 
moral, rather than feminine or erotogenic masochism (the latter two involve physical and sexual 
torture), not least because, according to Freud, moral masochism is ‘chiefly remarkable for having 
loosened its connection with what we recognize as sexuality’.15 Although this does not mean that 
the libido is absent from the practices of moral masochism, it is at least sublimated. We are, in 
other words, able to preserve our understanding of educational practices as non-erotic, and for that 
reason respectable, whilst entertaining the idea that education could be, in some sense, masochistic. 
 
Though we will discuss moral masochism at length below, we nonetheless suggest that Freud’s 
brief analysis of erotogenic masochism is most telling, since it foregrounds the relation between 
the self-annihilating ‘death drive’16 and the operations of the libido. This connects with and extends 
our understanding of educational violence – or ‘benign violence’17 – in that it helps us to see how 
the annihilating tendency of education, which is oriented towards failure and diminishment, is 
combined with the avowedly nurturing, enabling ethos characteristic of all well-meaning educators. 
We suggest that, through an engagement with Freud, we might achieve greater understanding of 
how a positive educational ethos exists alongside and manages to survive the persistent 
shortcomings, and systemic failings of institutionalised education. Indeed, as we argue below, 
masochism could be essential to the survival of Western education in its current form. To 
substantiate this claim we must carefully work through Freud’s theory of masochism, and explore 
how it might help us to understand what we view as the neurotic dimension of all educational 
relationships. 
                                                                    
13 Though ‘moral masochism’ is Freud’s chosen term in this essay, as the editor’s footnote points out, Freud had earlier proposed 
the term ‘mental masochism’ to refer to those ‘who find their pleasure, not in having physical pain inflicted on them, but in humiliation 
and mental torture’ (Freud cited in editor’s footnote: 2001a, p. 165). 
14 Freud, 2001a. These are all ‘secondary’ forms of masochism, not to be confused with ‘primary’ masochism, which, for Freud, is 
the death drive itself in its unmediated form. 
15 Freud, 2001a, p.165.  
16 The death instinct, as many commentators have noted, is not an instinct at all. See Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988, pp. 214-217. As 
such, even though we otherwise cite the translation from the Standard Edition verbatim, we amend ‘instinct’ to ‘drive’ and 
‘instinctual’ to ‘drive-induced’. 
17 Allen, 2014. 
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Framing masochism 
 
Freud begins his discussion of masochism with a conundrum: ‘if mental processes are governed by 
the pleasure principle [an enduring hypothesis in Freud’s work]…masochism is 
incomprehensible’.18 Unlike its counterpart, sadism, where pleasure is derived from inflicting pain 
on others, masochism ties pleasure to processes that endanger the organism experiencing it. This 
strange association between pain and pleasure is subsequently explained by Freud as being due to 
the interaction of ‘two classes of drives’ – ‘the death drives and the erotic (libidinal) life drives’.19 
Freud goes on to explain what he means by this, though not before a brief diversion, considering 
an alternative account of pleasure before he embarks on his discussion of masochism. This 
alternative vision is altogether more disturbing20, and Freud retreats from it, declaring quite simply: 
‘But such a view cannot be correct’.21 We draw attention to the existence of this aborted argument 
in Freud’s essay to make the point that Freud’s subsequent account of how masochism functions 
is less objectionable in terms of its consequences than it might have been. Indeed, as we explain 
below, Freud’s account might invite ambivalence in relation to the problem of masochism, even 
acceptance. It strikes us that, as we extend Freud’s account of masochism to education we might 
invite similar ambivalence, where to identify education as masochistic is to open a problematic 
space of reflection, rather than embark upon a rejection of, or at least polemic against education.  
 
Of the three forms of masochism, Freud identifies erotogenic masochism (involving sexual 
excitation) as the basis of the other two. He begins by alerting the reader to the fact that his analysis 
will remain ‘incomprehensible unless one decides to make certain assumptions about matters that 
are extremely obscure’.22 The reader must, we are told, accept the abstractions Freud is about to 
introduce, most notably: 
 
In (multicellular) organisms the libido meets the drive of death, or destruction, which is 
dominant in them and which seeks to disintegrate the cellular organism and to conduct 
each separate unicellular organism [composing it] into a state of inorganic stability’.23  
 
Faced with such a destructive impulse, the libido ‘has the task of making the destroying drive 
innocuous’. To an extent it fulfils this task, Freud argues, by diverting the so-called death drive 
outwards, in acts of aggression directed towards objects in the external world. Mediated by the 
libido, this drive, which can be called ‘the destructive drive, the drive for mastery, or the will to 
power’, becomes what Freud calls ‘sadism proper’.24 Sadism is, then, the death drive directed 
outwards by the erotic (libidinal) life drives. But this is not the end of the matter. The outward 
projection of the death drive does not exhaust it. Another portion of the destructive drive ‘remains 
                                                                    
18 Freud, 2001a, p. 159. 
19 Freud, 2001a, p. 159. 
20 In this rival account Freud speculates that every unpleasure might be understood as coinciding ‘with a heightening, and every 
pleasure with a lowering, of mental tension due to stimulus’ (159-60). Pleasure is associated with the calming of the mental apparatus, 
with ‘the purpose of reducing to nothing, or at least of keeping as low as possible, the sums of excitation which flow in upon it’ 
(159). Such an account of pleasure, as a kind of serene state, nonetheless places pleasure ‘in the service of the death drives, whose 
aim is to conduct the restlessness of life into the stability of the inorganic state’. Pleasure would hence be redefined as opposed to 
the ‘demands of the life drives – the libido’, and be as such a kind of death drive seeking the annihilation of the organism that 
experiences it. This might well explain masochism and its association of pleasure and pain, but Freud abruptly ends this line of 
argument (according to Bersani (59), this was the hypothesis that Freud had been simultaneously recognising and repressing since 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle). Freud instead opts for an apparently more nuanced, and one might observe, more palatable hypothesis 
(which occupies him for the remainder of the essay), where pleasure is partly redeemed.   
21 Freud, 2001a, p. 160. 
22 Freud, 2001a, p. 161. 
23 Freud, 2001a, p.163. 
24 Freud, 2001a, p. 163. 
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inside the organism and, with the help of the accompanying sexual excitation described above, 
becomes libidinally bound there’.25 This is what Freud calls erotogenic masochism.  
 
As we extend the analysis of masochism to educational relations (both those directed outwards and 
those directed inwards), it is important to note the complexity, mutual relationality, and fluidity of 
these associations between drives (as Freud might put it), or in our terms; the complexity, 
relationality, and fluidity of these historically acquired habits. Though Freud admits he is without 
the means to understand how, exactly, the taming of the death drive by the libido is effected, he 
does point out that there must be ‘a very extensive fusion and amalgamation, in varying 
proportions, of the two classes of drives’. We never encounter ‘pure life drives or pure death drives’ 
but ‘only mixtures of them in different amounts’.26 By analogy, it is this strange mixture of the 
annihilating and enabling tendencies of education that forces us, as critics, into engaging with 
education with a certain amount of ambivalence, or at least cause for hesitation. Though education 
may involve considerable symbolic violence, systematic disadvantage, exclusion and diminishment, 
and at the other extreme may involve moments of (for contemporary morality) unacceptable erotic 
interest (on the part of the teacher or student), it largely achieves the ‘diffusion’27 of these two rival 
tendencies. This so-called diffusion results in situations that are as insidious as they are hard to 
detect. 
 
Typically, education treads a middle ground, less erotically charged or outright violent than it has 
the potential to be.28 Nonetheless, these allusions to erotic and destructive impulses, which, we 
claim, are built into the architecture of Western educational relations, may, even in their diffuse 
form still strike most readers as too scandalous and over-drawn to warrant serious consideration. 
And so (as suggested above) we might move swiftly to a discussion of moral masochism, which is 
‘chiefly remarkable for having loosened its connection with what we recognise as sexuality’.29 As 
we do so, however, we must remember that for Freud (at least in this particular essay of his) 
erotogenic masochism is still the root form, and as such, cannot be absolutely disconnected from 
its sublimated heir. Similarly, though moral masochism may at first sight appear more palatable, as 
we explore below, it could have equally disturbing implications. 
 
It is also worth noting in passing that the deliberate association, and intermingling between rival 
drives and tendencies in Freud’s work, extends also to the distinction between sadism and 
masochism introduced above. These two opposing channels by which the death drive is modulated 
and expressed cannot be entirely separated, since Freud suggests a degree of fluidity, or potential 
for movement, between them, where the ‘drive for destruction, which has been directed outwards’ 
can ‘be once more introjected, turned inwards’.30 Presumably, introjected impulses might also be 
redirected outwards. Indeed, this informs our understanding of education, where there is, we claim, 
a complex relationship between its learned masochistic and sadistic impulses. As we seek to 
exemplify below in our analysis of film, the educator’s learned masochisms justify his or her 
sadisms, and the sadism of the educator becomes a prompt for ever more introverted masochisms 
– all of which would be unbearable if it were not for the binding of pleasurable satisfaction into 
forms of educational discomfort.  
 
                                                                    
25 Freud, 2001a, pp. 163-4. 
26 Freud, 2001a, p. 164. 
27 Freud, 2001a, p. 164. 
28 This should not be taken to imply that education in its moderate, moderating form is the least of all evils. Its tendency to reconcile 
or at least bring into peaceful connection rival tendencies is not, necessarily, to be admired. Just as, for Freud, ‘heterosexual genitality’ 
represents the ‘hierarchical stabilization of sexuality’s component instincts’ (Bersani, 1986, p. 32) – a deeply problematic assumption 
on Freud’s behalf that normalises and excludes – the principles of measure and the attempted ordering of life by education as it 
combines and enfolds its libidinal and destructive investments is not necessarily desirable. Education achieves a hierarchical 
stabilisation of forces that also enforces a vision of the world akin in scope and coercive self-righteousness to its heteronormative 
cousin.   
29 Freud, 2001a, p. 165. 
30 Freud, 2001a, p. 164. 
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As we approach our discussion of moral masochism, which, for Freud, is just as ‘unmistakably 
pathological’,31 we should also point out where we depart from Freud’s analysis, or perhaps more 
accurately, where we deepen and further extend Freud’s pathological diagnosis. Freud identifies 
the strength of moral masochism (the tendency for those receiving it to ‘react inversely’ to ‘praise 
or appreciation’, leading to a further decline in their condition32), and its hold upon at least some 
of us, as ‘one of the most serious resistances and the greatest danger to the success of our medical 
or educational aims’33 – we will explain why it is so resistant in what follows. We, by contrast, argue 
that the reach of this neurosis extends into education itself. The strength of moral masochism today 
is its near ubiquity. Unlike Freud’s, ours is a decidedly unredemptive reading, which offers no hope 
of salvation through existing educational means, since these means are infected by the neurosis 
they might hope to combat.  
 
Freud links his discussion of moral masochism to his earlier work on the conscience, because at 
first sight it seems as though moral masochism is an example of an ‘especially sensitive conscience’, 
as it reacts inversely to praise or appreciation.34 Recapping his earlier work, Freud explains that the 
conscience is the residual effect of parental authority, which becomes internalised in the super-ego. 
As a function that inflicts discomfort on the self, the conscience could be easily confused with 
moral masochism: ‘We may be forgiven for having confused the two to begin with’35, presumably 
since both involve the introjection of a destructive impulse. The key dimension of the conscience, 
however, is that it entails ‘consciousness of guilt as an expression of a tension between the ego and 
the super-ego’.36 Moral masochism is different, in that it is largely undetectable by the person 
afflicted – and this, precisely, is why it is so resistant to therapy. Though our ethical sense, which 
is produced by the conscience, employs the sadism of the super-ego to inflict its violence on the 
guilty subject, moral masochism operates directly through the ego. This is why ‘the masochistic 
trend of the ego remains as a rule concealed from the subject and has to be inferred from his [or 
her] behaviour’. For Freud, this is by stark contrast to the ‘sadism of the super-ego’ that becomes 
for the most part ‘glaringly conscious’.37  
 
This may seem a little abstract, and overly dependent on an acceptance of Freud’s prior theory of 
the ego, the super-ego, and their interaction. Nonetheless, we would argue that a distinction appears 
here, in Freud’s work, that could help explain why some educators might struggle to identify with 
the claims made towards the beginning of this paper; namely, the suggestion that the educator is 
bound to his or her pupils, so that the difficulties of the latter bear heavily on the conscience of 
the former, forcing teachers to carry the success of education, and the educational encounter on 
their conscience as a component of Freud’s notion of moral masochism. Even fewer educators 
would identify with the further claim, that this mutual bind, which involves considerable 
discomfort for all involved, is also enjoyed, where the educator derives satisfaction from being 
made at least partly responsible for the success of his or her pupils. Educators are both fettered to 
and libidinally invested in their students. As they tie themselves in knots regarding responsibilities 
they can never fulfill, hopes they can never satisfy, educators experience a quickening of the pulse, 
a quota of pleasure. But perhaps educators should not be expected to identify with these claims. 
We, indeed, as authors, struggle to identify with them. We find our affective commitments to 
education difficult to escape, as we struggle to understand why we and other educators remain 
within this masochistic bind which fetters the educator to an educational project that must, as a 
rule, involve considerable failure as well as success. It is surely odd that educators continue to feel 
bad about outcomes that are inevitable, when failure must be produced by a hierarchizing and 
stratifying system that needs failure in order to conceptualize success. It is strange that the 
educator’s guilt leads to redoubled effort, and that the educator can derive some kind of satisfaction 
                                                                    
31 Freud, 2001a, p. 166. 
32 Freud, 2001b, p. 49. 
33 Freud, 2001a, p. 166. 
34 Freud, 2001a, pp. 168-9. 
35 Freud, 2001a, p. 169. 
36 Freud, 2001a, pp. 166-7. 
37 Freud, 2001a, p. 169. 
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from that effort. It is odd, not simply that we remain at work but that we retain our fond attachment 
to the idea that educators are, at core, well intended; that education provides a suitable context for 
these good intentions to be expressed. These problems seem intractable, though the language by 
which we frame this conundrum may well be part of the problem. We proceed as though we might 
render educational commitments intelligible, however perverse they may turn out to be. It could 
be that the fettering of the educator to education is largely automated (as an acquired habit), and 
beyond interrogation. It could be that this self-destructive, uncomfortable, but strangely gratifying 
bind that Freud describes, and that we will go on to explore in the context of education, is barely 
available to inspection. Perhaps the economy of educational masochism can only be inferred from 
the behavior of educators, rather than confirmed through some kind of confession or confessional 
analysis.  
 
If these intuitions are correct – intuitions that associate educational discomfort with Freud’s 
conception of moral masochism – it should also be observed that if the ego of the educator is 
already tied to its own destruction, it has no need of a super-ego (recall, that for Freud, the ego of 
the moral masochist is already bent on its own destruction in such a way that this impulse evades 
detection). Or to frame this slightly differently, the self-destructive operations of the educator may 
be less dependent on a super-ego, with its links to governmental authority, than is generally 
assumed. This argument is worth attending to, since most commentators still blame the latter for 
submitting education to its reductive, ‘anti-educational’ demands.38 We may instead have reached a 
stage where educators diminish themselves to a great extent automatically and unconsciously. The 
demands made by an increasingly elaborate regime of audit and inspection – of efforts to embed 
performative regimes such as performance related pay – would, from this point of view, be mere 
embellishment to educational subjectivities that are already committed to their own subjugation. 
The imperium of an overweening governmental authority finds itself knocking on an open door.  
 
This distinction between the educational conscience (as something we can become conscious of) 
and the largely unconscious, drive-induced masochistic tendency of the educator, also helps to 
explain how morality (as an explicit set of commitments and ideals) can be largely evacuated from 
educational discourse and practice, without reducing the commitment of educators to their 
practice. It explains how much of the educator’s work can now involve a commitment to practices 
and procedures that stretch our definition of education as a values-based endeavor, without 
breaking education as an institutional, economic activity. It explains how the masochistic educator 
can diligently operate within a system that they conceive of as destroying or undermining a more 
‘authentic’ education, approached as a morally informed activity, whilst retaining his or her 
commitments to the performance of being an educator. This educator will ‘do what is inexpedient’ 
from the perspective of a morally informed educational practice, without threatening his or her 
status or self-understanding as an educator. The masochistic educator, or the masochist within the 
educator has escaped morality in this sense, and become available to cynicism, whilst retaining the 
sense that the profession is still worthy of regard. As will be upheld in our concluding reading of 
Dead Poet’s Society, this educator will dutifully ‘act against his [or her] own interests’, will ‘ruin the 
prospects which open out to him [or her]’, and will perhaps even ‘destroy his [or her] own 
existence’,39 whilst retaining a commitment to education and the dignity of the educator that is to 
all intents and purposes being undermined by the same individual.   
 
To follow the argument of Freud’s essay to its last remarks, we might also add the disturbing claim 
that the educator is only in this self-destructive position due to the ‘cultural suppression of the drives’ 
which education has achieved. In teaching us to hold back our destructive impulses, to live within 
the ordered violence of institutional education, it has held back, in Freud’s terms, ‘a large part of 
the subject’s destructive impulses from being exercised in life’.40 Due to its careful ordering of 
                                                                    
38 This position is so dominant in educational critique that it would be unfair to single out authors and reductive to offer a string of 
exemplary references. It is the framework that structures understanding, rather than a position that individual researchers choose 
to occupy. 
39 Freud, 2001a, pp. 169-170. 
40 Freud, 2001a, p. 170. 
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violence, education generates a situation where violence turns inwards, where masochism is 
intensified so that it constitutes the ego of the educator and educated person. To the extent that 
educated people are still able to reflect on their own inevitable destruction, we would claim that 
they are oddly consoled by that prospect, as if their martyrdom to education would be the finest 
expression of their commitment to it. Indeed, given the role of the libido in constituting this 
perverse connection of pleasure to pain inherent in masochism, we should notice how the 
‘[educated] subject’s destruction of him [or her]self cannot take place without libidinal 
satisfaction’.41 Education is destroying itself, and we love it. 
 
 
Educational symptoms of the masochistic economy 
 
Freud’s analysis of masochism allows us to better understand how education is underpinned and 
maintained by the libidinal investment of the educator – a term we use to refer to those who are 
(and this includes almost all of us) ideologically wedded to the success of education. This 
commitment to the success of education is connected in modernity to the idea that education will, 
at its best, aim to secure success, progress, and betterment for all at the level of morality, rather 
than simply improve education along instrumental lines, according to a reduced, reductive, and 
technical understanding of the world. Another way of describing this predicament is to say that the 
educator has a libidinal attachment to the idea that education is inherently redemptive, not simply 
on an individual basis, but socially, politically, even economically. That is to say, it does not merely 
provide contextually specific and pragmatic accommodations to the world as it is, but a deeper, 
‘moral’ value. The commitment to the inherent beneficence of education informs, enframes and 
justifies the educator’s love of the student, the educator’s love of education, and ultimately, the 
educator’s love of him or herself as an educated person. What is peculiar about this commitment 
is that it not only helps obscure the underpinning violence of educational relations (by adding a 
layer of good feeling to them), it also establishes the necessary conditions for that violence. Here again Freud 
is instructive, since masochism involves an intimate, and enduring relation between the libido and 
the death-drive. This might explain how the educator’s love of education exists alongside the 
accompanying drive – also intrinsic to all educational experience – to discipline, diminish, fail when 
necessary, and even destroy those involved in the educational relationship. Freud’s conception of 
erotogenic masochism also draws attention – again crucially for us – to the opposite of erotogenic 
masochism, namely, sadism, which is built into the Western educational tradition and its drive to 
mastery.42  
 
The figure of the educator, who has attained some form of educational success, is marked by an 
implicit self-assurance of the benefits of education. This assurance manifests itself in the certainty 
with which many educators, and those who consider themselves educated, celebrate and perpetuate 
education as the primary means to social and self-betterment. The learned masochism which 
underpins their own experience of education comes to guide the structure and process of their own 
pedagogic practices. A stark example of where this masochistic process reaches its limit is in the 
experience of teaching students who, for whatever reason, do not submit themselves to learn in a 
particular context. These students refuse or simply do not experience the inbuilt, automated guilt 
associated with ‘not learning’ that educators wield as their primary weapon. The educator, by 
contrast, has had this guilt, concomitant with moral masochism, grafted on to their psychic and 
social sense of being and will not hesitate in projecting its destructive impulse outwards. They have 
subjected themselves to education so thoroughly that the slippage between their internal sense of 
guilt and the projection of that guilt onto the external educational subject become an extension of 
the same movement. What intransigent pupils nonetheless produce is a situation where the 
educator cannot ‘appeal’ to the will to learn of the student. The educator and the student do not 
                                                                    
41 Freud, 2001a, p. 170. 
42 Allen, 2016. 
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appear to share a common masochistic economy, and so there is no connection between them 
along these lines, at least, not in that instance. This forces the apparently well-meaning educator to 
switch techniques, opting for more overt disciplinary interventions. The educator must adopt the 
harsh, judgemental tones of the super-ego. 
 
For Freud, this educator is forced to resort to ‘ethical’ means, to the enactments of a moralising 
self. In his terms, the ‘ethical sense’ is created by drive-induced renunciation, which then ‘expresses 
itself in conscience and demands a further renunciation of drive’.43 As an individual who has been 
successfully introduced into, and has come to manifest the key subjective frameworks of the 
prevailing moral order, the educator has had their own drives co-opted, and now they seek to do 
the same to their students. To the extent that education still operates through the conscience, 
educators enforce that conscience either through direct appeal to educational systems of value (‘do 
this because it is important for x reason’), or through indirect appeal to those systems of value (‘do 
this because I tell you to [for reasons that must remain obscure to you, but which nonetheless 
inform my practice, and will become apparent after you submit to them]’). As we have argued, this 
operates alongside a region of guilt established by educational masochism, which we might describe 
as ‘guilt without conscience’, a form of automated guilt, unavailable to reflection.44 It has no need 
of a super-ego (internally manifested, or externally reinforced) for its enforcement. For this reason, 
no conflict appears between a super-ego and a recalcitrant ego that would make the enforcement 
of that guilt apparent.  
 
To recap, Freud claims that masochism – and we would say education – comes from ‘the death 
drive and corresponds to the part of that drive which has escaped being turned outwards as a drive 
of destruction.’45 We would claim that, through the educational relation, this drive can be redirected 
outwards, and conditions the educator’s near-instinctual repulsion when faced with situations of 
‘not learning’. The educated masochist becomes a sadistic educator through the outward projection 
of the educator’s ‘guilt without conscience’. And here it is worth pausing to reflect on that external 
projection when Freud writes that, since this manifestation of the death drive ‘has the significance 
of an erotic component even the subject’s destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal 
satisfaction.’46 Freud is only suggesting that this erotic component is manifested through self-
destruction, but if, as we claim, the educational relation is an outward projection of internal guilt 
experienced in ‘not learning’, libidinal satisfaction can, in fact, be produced through the destructive 
co-option of the students’ drives by the educator in the name of education. 
 
To support this interpretation, we can turn to Jacques Lacan’s own reading of part of Freud’s 
Civilization and Its Discontents (which expands on many of the themes we have introduced above, 
including the pastoral), from his seventh seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, which itself purports 
its primary aim as ‘deepening our understanding of the economic problem of masochism’.47 In 
Lacan’s interpretation of Freud, the paradox of ‘moral conscience’ 
 
shows itself to be more demanding the more refined it becomes, crueller and crueller 
even as we offend it less and less, more and more fastidious as we force it, by abstaining 
from acts, to go and seek us out at the most intimate levels of our impulses or desires. 
In short, the insatiable character of this moral conscience, its paradoxical cruelty, 
transforms it within the individual into a parasite that is fed by the satisfactions accorded 
                                                                    
43 Freud, 2001a, p. 170. 
44 It remains unclear to us whether this guilt might be a residual effect of a departed conscience (where the framework of value that 
animated that conscience has fallen away) and hence would be a ‘guilt without conscience’ in the literal sense; or whether this guilt 
might be a misdiagnosis of the experience of educational masochism (i.e. it only feels like guilt, because that is how we are 
consciously accustomed to understanding and interpreting the experience of educational bad feeling). 
45 Freud, 2001a, p. 170. 
46 Freud, 2001a, p. 170. 
47 Lacan, 2008, p. 18. 
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to it. Ethics punishes the individual relatively much less for his faults than for his 
misfortunes.48 
 
This paradoxical formula, which reflects the connection that Freud draws between libidinal 
satisfaction and moral masochism at the end of ‘The Economic Problem of Masochism’, takes on 
an even darker hue when applied to the context of education. Of course, most contemporary 
Western educators rightly see themselves as far removed from something like the harsh 
disciplinarian of the Victorian schoolroom, but what Lacan and, for him, Freud, open a way 
towards thinking, is the cruelty of a refined moral conscience. For Lacan, as for Freud, this moral 
conscience is only explored as far as its manifestation inward, however, the most commonplace 
classroom settings make clear that this refined cruelty has an outward facing dimension as well. We 
might also dwell further on the sentence, ‘Ethics punishes the individual relatively much less for 
his faults than for his misfortunes’, by reflecting on the practices of educators in contexts where 
student cohorts are primarily made up of socially marginal and/or underprivileged groups. 
Education is presented as the cure to social ills in the absence of sufficient material support – 
alongside which, any professed lack of desire to engage with this ‘educational solution’ is so alien 
to educational thought, so unavailable to inspection, understanding and sympathy, that it can only 
be described as deviant. The cruel paradox of this ‘guilt without conscience’ is projected outward 
by educators in our schoolrooms, with the expectation that it be internalized in the psyche of their 
students. It is insatiable, completely without sympathy, and the source of an ideology that declares 
‘all can achieve success’, though few will, or can.  
 
Representing the Masochistic Economy in Education: Dead Poets Society 
 
A prominent representation of educational experiences, which has arguably risen to the heights of 
cultural phenomenon, is the 1989 film Dead Poets Society. We do not suggest that it is directly 
representative of educational experience in schooling, but rather that it is representative of a 
cultural desire for what schooling should be like, thereby being productive of the masochistic 
economy it also represents. Our reading will suggest that the film exhibits the most destructive – 
which is also to say, most ‘enjoyable’ – components of the masochistic economy in education, both 
on the screen and in the experiences of its audiences. The film shows how pleasure and guilt 
conjoin in education, as well as enhancing both the pleasure and guilt the audience might feel in 
relation to education. This represented guilt operates on two levels, first in terms of the explicit 
structure of the institution the boys attend, Welton Academy, and its prioritisation of a 
responsibility towards academic success and professional careers. We would suggest that this 
operation of guilt is not only too consciously, overtly enforced via the rhetoric of the teachers and 
in the minds of the boys, but is also not pleasurable enough to successfully engender anything 
approaching erotogenic or moral masochism in the Freudian sense. By contrast the second 
operation of guilt, exhibited primarily through the lessons of Mr Keating (played by Robin 
Williams) and their effects, combines nuanced forms of both moral masochism and erotogenic 
masochism (and thus constitutes what we have called ‘guilt without conscience’). 49 
 
We position our own reading directly in opposition and in ironic relation to an article by Éamonn 
Dunne, which tells us that the film is ‘a powerfully emotive treatise on radical pedagogical practice, 
an allegorical representation of the power of perversity to make us fall in love with the aberrant, 
the rebellious, the transgressive’.50 We argue instead that Mr Keating does not escape the 
                                                                    
48 Lacan, 2008, p. 110. 
49 Clarke (2018) also draws attention to the stifling effects of Keating’s injunction to enjoy. In this analysis, Clarke contrasts the 
traditional authority of the school to Keating’s equally constraining transgressive approach via a distinction between the prohibitive 
‘Oedipal’ father, and the obscene ‘anal’ father, or ‘Master of Enjoyment’ (see Žižek 2005, p. 206). Though the violence of the latter 
is harder to identify, it is probably still easier to identify than masochism, since it is located in the educational superego, rather than 
residing more fundamentally in the ego. 
50 Dunne, 2013, p. 633. 
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conservative, conformist intentions and morally disciplinary traditions of education. Nor does he 
escape the masochistic economy which underpins and exceeds them; he exemplifies and intensifies 
those economies. The forms of pedagogy Keating engages in are, then, not to be seen in opposition 
to other more obviously traditional forms but rather as their necessary complement. Keating 
himself is the successful product of the system (and we would say, masochistic economy) that 
critics such as Dunne suggest he rebels against.51 
  
We might here return to the contrast between the work of conscience and the work of masochism 
in education. As outlined above, the key dimension of conscience is ‘consciousness of guilt as an 
expression of a tension between the ego and the super-ego’.52 This is clearly in play in the duty the 
schoolboys feel towards their parents in completing their studies successfully. One of the 
introductory scenes of the film shows two of the boys criticising Neil Perry for obeying his father, 
while eventually admitting that they do the same with their parents. While these pupils may gain 
some pleasure from satisfying their parents desires for them, and they certainly suffer the pains of 
boredom and lost free time along the way, this is not an example of moral masochism but rather 
conscience. Moral masochism, as we have said, is different, in that it is largely undetectable by the 
person afflicted – the boys whom Keating lumbers with guilt via his injunction to ‘seize the day’, 
that is to say for the absence of what could be called their own self-realization, are not aware that 
they are being made to feel guilt. They do not realise that they punish themselves with the 
whispered motto Carpe Diem, precisely because they also take pleasure in their ridiculously 
optimistic attempts to act it out. The ethical sense, which is primarily produced by the effects of 
the school and the parents on the conscience of the boys, employs the sadism of the super-ego to 
inflict its violence on the guilty subject, while the moral masochism of Mr Keating operates directly 
through the ego (in Freud’s terms). This is why when watching Dead Poets Society, we must remember 
that ‘the masochistic trend of the ego remains as a rule concealed from the subject and has to be 
inferred from his behaviour’. This is especially the case as the ‘sadism of the super-ego’, represented 
primarily by Headmaster Nolan, and the authoritarian father Mr Perry is, in Freud’s words, again, 
‘glaringly conscious’.53  
  
A key point of clarification to be made before proceeding with our reading of the film is that 
Keating is not only presented as a masochistic educator, but also a sadistic educator, who 
encourages masochistic psychologies in his students. By contrast, we would argue that the other 
educators (and Mr Perry) are, in fact, at once too educationally pragmatic (in the conventional 
sense) to exhibit any substantial sado-masochistic tendencies. Even the ‘harsh’ actions of the 
headmaster (when he paddles Charlie Dalton) or Mr Perry (when he threatens to withdrawn Neil 
from Welton) are pragmatic rather than sadistic actions. The harsh pragmatism of the school is tied 
to the notion that severe discipline is what maintains their position as ‘the best preparatory boys 
school in the United States’ (as it is described in the film) – where the quality of the school is 
defined by the quota it sends to the ‘Ivy League’. This reduction of education to instrumental ends 
is what the film overtly invites us to question. In doing so, it appears to critique the inherent 
violence of some educational relations, but this critique fails to identify and challenge their sado-
masochistic component. The irony here is that the non-sadistic and non-masochistic aspects of 
education are those which are under attack in the film. The film tries to teach us that this severe, 
pragmatic approach to education is hollow and superficial and that what we really need is an 
impassioned education which helps us reveal our true selves to ourselves, whatever the cost. In 
                                                                    
51 It is worth pointing out that our argument also differs from the analysis offered by McLaren and Leonardo (1998) who claim 
(unlike Dunne) that Keating’s inspirational, norm-breaking pedagogy, fails to meet the aims of revolutionary pedagogy. To do so, 
it must transcend ‘idiosyncratic acts of bourgeois transgression’ and the ‘performative moments of apostasy’ that we witness in the 
film (p. 139). This may be true, but McLaren and Leonardo’s analysis only perpetuates (in a way that is characteristic for critical 
pedagogy) a problematic vision of the redemptive pedagogue, whose very attachment to education, from our point of view, might 
be their most pernicious (because untroubled) inheritance. So, whilst we agree that the students ‘lack the ability to articulate a 
political project’ that allows them to transform the social conditions within which they are confined (p. 141), we do not assume that 
a more critically configured education, in the guise of a better Keating, is what they need. Rather, it might be necessary to interrogate 
the masochistic economy that Keating (either in his existing, or in an improved form) both represents and deepens. 
52 Freud, 2001a, 166-7. 
53 Freud, 2001a, pp. 166-7. 
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fact, the ‘cost’ is precisely what makes this more authentic education so visibly ‘valuable’. This is 
the masochistic economy operating in education as the co-option of the drive. 
  
The lesson of the film, then, is that we should not accept a form of schooling which neglects the 
inherent value of education in favour of its instrumentally driven ‘double’. We should strive for 
‘authenticity’ in education, even in a structural context (at least superficially) opposed to its 
existence or practice. The lingering question might then be: if this authentic education is supposedly 
so rare, why has the representation of it resonated with so many viewers? We argue that this is 
because the rhetoric of authenticity and inherent value is, in fact, not at all absent from the majority 
of educational discourse and practice, such as suggested by Dead Poets Society, and is, on the contrary, 
utterly ubiquitous.54 In this sense, the film is at once a nightmare and a fantasy of education, 
polarizing two of its key principles and co-implicated economies: pragmatism and masochism. The 
only point in the film where these two polarities clearly meet and show mutual support for one 
another (in a manner which we suggest is far more representative of actual pedagogical 
dispositions) is in the scene after Charlie Dalton pretends to receive a phone call from God in 
school assembly, requesting that girls should be allowed into the school. This prank is significantly 
engendered by the production of Dalton’s masochistic psychology through Keating’s sadistic 
pedagogy, where the boys are taught to experience guilt for, amongst other things, not ‘walking 
their own walk’. Keating, enhancing the sadism of his pedagogy, takes no responsibility for Dalton’s 
behaviour and explains (with a reference to the mantra of the Dead Poets Society, whose 
Emersonian goal it is to ‘suck all the marrow out of life’) that ‘Sucking all the marrow out of life 
doesn’t mean choking on the bone’ and that ‘you being expelled from school is not daring to me, 
it’s stupid’, not least because, as he tells Dalton with a wry smile, being expelled from the school 
would mean he wouldn’t be able to attend Keating’s classes. He effectively explains to the boys 
that they should be both pragmatic and passionate, indicating (again contrary to Dunne’s reading) 
that the supposed ‘rebellion’ he advocates, only has sustainable value within the strictures of the 
pragmatic aspects of education. Thus, masochism acts as the support for pragmatism in education, 
or at least finds itself (and its inherent violence) articulated to the violently reductive demands of 
an accompanying pragmatic logic.  
 
Though Dead Poets Society allows us to meditate on the mundane presence of masochism in 
educational environments, it does also explore the potential of that same masochism (with its 
shifting and necessarily unstable configuration of death and life-oriented drives), to exceed that 
mundane economy: a child commits suicide; a child is expelled; a teacher is sacked. And yet, this 
does not place the underpinning masochism of the film, and Keating’s pedagogy, in question. The 
audience is put in the position of experiencing a vicarious masochism through the educationally 
inspired self-destruction of Dalton, Perry, and Keating. As we have argued in our reading of Freud, 
the ‘[educated] subject’s destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction’.55 
And the audience loves it. This is nowhere better figured than in the final, now extremely famous, 
scene, where Keating’s exit is met with some of the boys taking to stand on the tables and 
proclaiming, ‘Captain, my captain’, in the middle of a suitably uninspiring lesson taken by the 
headmaster. The tragedy of Perry’s suicide appears overshadowed by the sacking of Keating. This 
apparently stirring scene, even now, remains in public consciousness. Its sustained resonance was 
exemplified in the wake of Robin Williams’s 2014 suicide, where fans from across the world 
performed this scene in tribute to him. Why does this scene remain so affective? Our claim, which 
is really the major claim this paper seeks to make, is that, through co-opting the death drive (or the 
basic destructiveness and malice that is built into the Western educational tradition), education 
teaches us to take pleasure in pain, first and foremost within the workings of its own economies.  
 
Coda 
                                                                    
54 For a sustained engagement with this topic see, Ladkin, McKay & Bojesen, 2016. 
55 Freud, 2001a, p. 170. 
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We might emphasise, in concluding, that this reading of masochism in education is not a simple 
extension of Freudian theory to education. It reads Freud against himself insofar as Freud assigns 
education, together with other authorities (religion, government, etc.), the role of further 
developing the chastising, norm enforcing super-ego, which was set up following the dissolution 
of the Oedipus complex.56 According to our reading, education is not simply a vehicle for enforcing 
the super-ego, serving its function in society as a ‘cultural super-ego’, as Freud later put it in 
Civilization and its Discontents.57 Here too, we distance ourselves from a tendency amongst educational 
critics to constantly point out that education is an enforcer of cultural norms. These norms, so the 
argument goes, are often left hidden within its operations, and by implication demand the 
intervention of the educational critic to reveal them. Freud would probably help complicate this. 
Though modern education conceptualised here as a super-ego enforcer, does inherit the precept: 
‘You ought to be like this (like your father)’, that injunction is accompanied by the prohibition: ‘You 
may not be like this (like your father)’.58 In other words, education consistently denies our 
achievement of the norms it compels us to pursue and, as such, reveals itself as a somewhat shady 
operator in its adoptive role as norm enforcer. But, in our reading, this is not its only function. 
Education helps constitute, and serves to support the mortification of the educational ego. Not 
simply operating from above as a disciplinarian overlord, education roots its oppressions within 
that ego. It does so to such great effect because it maintains a love of education that will not be 
diminished however uncomfortable the experience of education may become.  
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